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Abstract
The interdependence between partners raises considerable interest in the sociology of life course,
work, and families. Partner influences play a particularly important role in the work domain, because
each partner’s work decisions have profound effects on the couple as a whole. In contrast to previous
research, this article pays detailed attention to the role a partner plays in workers’ labour market deci-
sions by analysing the case of early retirement decisions. We hypothesized that partners’ preferences
for older workers’ retirement originate from altruism and self-interest. Moreover, we expected that
partners influence older workers’ early retirement behaviour via persuasion and pressure. To ad-
equately estimate partners’ and workers’ preferences for the worker’s retirement, we used an instru-
mental variable approach. This was possible because we collected multi-actor longitudinal data from
a large representative sample of older workers and their partners in the Netherlands. The results sup-
port that spousal preferences originate in altruism and self-interest and that partners influence
workers through persuasion and pressure. Gender differences in origins and mechanisms of partner
influence are also discussed.
When two people share their lives, either as cohabiting
or marital partners, they will inevitably influence one
another. The interdependence between partners raises
considerable interest in the sociology of life course,
work, and families. Partner influences play a particularly
important role in the work domain, because each part-
ner’s work decisions have profound effects on the couple
as a whole. Such effects might be due to the social cap-
ital provided by participation in the labour market: each
partner benefits from the social capital the other obtains
(e.g. Bernasco, de Graaf and Ultee, 1998; Blossfeld and
Drobnic, 2001; Verbakel and De Graaf, 2009; Bro¨ckel,
Busch-Heizmann and Golsch, 2015). Partner influence
in the work domain might also run through economic
mechanisms, such as in the case of the division of paid
work and childcare (Raley, Bianchi and Wang, 2012). In
addition, partners influence each other’s careers indir-
ectly via decisions about where to live, as the literature
on tied movers and tied stayers has shown (Geist and
McManus, 2012).
A relatively understudied example of partner influen-
ces lies in the decision to retire early. Examining the role
a partner plays in the early retirement decision is import-
ant, because most older workers approach retirement
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with a partner by their side (Statistics Netherlands,
2018a). Moreover, partners of older workers form an
increasingly diverse group in terms of gender and work
status. Nowadays, a rising number of women—and
married women in particular—are in paid employment
when reaching the public pension age (Statistics
Netherlands, 2019a,b). This development leaves work-
ers of both genders likely to face retirement in a couple
context. Moreover, it means that the situations in which
she is employed while he is retired are increasingly com-
mon. In this article, our aim is to shed more light on the
nature of partner influences in the decision to retire
early. In this study, we examine (i) why partners have
specific preferences for the worker’s retirement, and (ii)
how these preferences affect the worker’s early retire-
ment decision.
Previous research can be categorized into indirect
and direct studies of the role a partner plays in workers’
retirement decision. The first category consists of studies
that investigate how partner characteristics, such as
work status and health, affect workers’ retirement
(Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage, 2003; Schirle, 2008; Loretto
and Vickerstaff, 2013). The interest in partners’ work
status is primarily driven by its role in making the shared
time more or less likely upon workers’ retirement
(Genadek, Flood and Moen, 2019). Partners’ health has
been argued—and found—to affect retirement: workers
might either expand their working lives to pay for for-
mal care giving or retire early to assume informal care
tasks (Johnson and Favreault, 2001). Indirect studies
such as these acknowledge that a cohabiting or marital
partner forms a part of the context in which older work-
ers take their decision to retire. However, they only look
at the characteristics of the partner, not at the preference
the partner might have concerning the worker’s retirement
or at the way a partner tries to influence the worker.
The second category of studies into the role a partner
plays in workers’ retirement decision investigates the ef-
fect of a partner’s preference on workers’ retirement.
Many of these studies, however, rely on workers’ per-
ceptions of their partner’s preference (Henkens and
Tazelaar, 1997; Van Dam, Van der Vorst and Van der
Heijden, 2009). The general finding is that perceived
partner preferences affect older workers’ intentions for
and actual early retirement. The approach of these stud-
ies does not do justice to the active role of partners, be-
cause workers’ perceptions do not necessarily coincide
with their partner’s actual preference (Kenny and
Acitelli, 2001). Only a few studies directly assess part-
ners’ preferences and take a true multi-actor approach
to retirement decision-making. Henkens (1999), for ex-
ample, collected data from both members of the couple
and showed that workers’ early retirement intentions
were affected by whether their partner preferred them to
retire early or not. Szinovacz and DeViney (2000) inves-
tigated the effect of the partner’s preference on workers’
retirement behaviour. They found that women, but not
men retired earlier if their partner preferred the worker
to stop working. However, this study did not control for
workers’ own preferences. As the members of a couple
usually influence each other’s attitudes (Davis and
Rusbult, 2001), Szinovacz and DeViney (2000) might
have overestimated the effects of partner influence on
women: these effects may have been confounded by the
indirect effect of workers’ own preferences via their
partner’s preference.
This study contributes to the literature in three ways.
First, the study aims to unravel the nature of partner in-
fluence. More specifically, we focus on the origins of
partners’ preferences for the worker’s early retirement
and the mechanisms of partner influence on the worker’s
retirement behaviour. The origins of partners’ preferen-
ces on older workers’ retirement pertain to the question
of why partners have specific preferences for the work-
er’s retirement. The mechanisms of partner influence on
older workers’ retirement pertain to the ways in which
partners’ preferences influence the worker’s retirement
decision. Second, we collected new multi-actor data on
older couples approaching retirement. In the NIDI
Pension Panel Study, data were collected from workers
(n¼ 6,793) as well as their partners. This kind of multi-
actor data is scarce compared with data available for
individual-level models. However, it is a prerequisite for
adopting a true multi-actor perspective and taking inter-
dependencies between the preferences of both members
of a couple into account. Third, the survey data were
supplemented with administrative data about workers’
early pension uptake, which provided us the opportunity
to study the relation between early retirement preferen-
ces and behaviour in a longitudinal manner. This is an
advancement of the literature on partner influences that
generally focused on either retirement preferences or re-
tirement behaviour (Henkens, 1999; Szinovacz and
DeViney, 2000).
This study was carried out in the Netherlands. Here,
as elsewhere, demographic changes face the government
with the challenge to guarantee adequate retirement in-
come while securing financially sustainable pension sys-
tems (OECD, 2017). The Dutch government recently
reformed the pension system to address this challenge.
Reforms included gradually increasing the eligibility for
state pension from age 65 to 67 and linking it to life ex-
pectancy in 2021. Moreover, opportunities to retire
early were limited. These reforms have weakened the
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early retirement culture (Euwals, Van Vuuren and
Wolthoff, 2010), but there is still considerable variation
in the age at retirement with many workers retiring be-
fore reaching the public pension age (Statistics
Netherlands, 2018c).
Theoretical Framework
Origins of Partners’ Preferences
Partners’ preferences can be endogenous as well as ex-
ogenous. Partners have endogenous preferences when
they adapt their own preferences for the worker’s retire-
ment to the preference the worker has for himself/her-
self. Partners have exogenous preferences when they
develop their preferences for the worker’s retirement
based on their own considerations. On the one hand,
partners might base their preferences on what they think
will benefit the worker (altruism). On the other hand,
they might prefer what they think is most beneficial to
themselves (self-interest). We elaborate on altruism and
self-interest as origins of partners’ preferences for the
worker’s early retirement below.
Altruism
Altruism is defined as a selfless concern for the well-
being of other people (Mansbridge, 1990). While psy-
chologists mainly focus on the personal characteristics
that distinguish variation across individuals, sociologists
focus on contextual conditions that foster or discourage
altruistic behaviour (Simpson and Willer, 2015).
However, the general consensus is that people have rea-
sons to prefer or act to bring about certain positive
events for others even though these do not benefit them-
selves or might even harm their own self-interest
(Piliavin and Charng, 1990). The tendency to act self-
lessly is particularly strong in communal relationships
like marriage (Clark et al., 2010). Altruism does not ne-
cessarily lead to preferences or behaviour that are in line
with the other person’s preferences (Oakley, 2013). In
the case of retirement, discrepancies may result from a
partner’s and a worker’s differential evaluations of the
costs and benefits of retirement. For example, a worker
might inadequately perceive a net cost of early retire-
ment and thus have different preferences than a partner
who accurately estimates its net benefits for the worker.
Altruistic reasons to prefer a worker’s early retire-
ment might arise first of all from the work sphere. The
level of stress that a worker experiences due to work
influences whether his/her partner expects the worker to
benefit from early retirement. We thus expect partners
to have a stronger preference for the worker’s retirement
the more stress the worker experiences from work.
Another factor that gives rise to altruistic reasons for a
partner to prefer the worker’s early retirement is the
worker’s health. The worker’s actual health and the ex-
tent to which the partner worries about the worker’s
health will influence how important it is for a partner to
see the worker’s health improved. As retirement is gen-
erally associated with healthier behaviour (Syseet al.,
2017) and has been shown to slow down health declines
(Van Den Bogaard, Henkens and Kalmijn, 2016), part-
ners are likely to see retirement as a health-investment
strategy. We thus expect partners to have a stronger
preference for the worker’s retirement the worse the
worker’s health is and the more partners worry about
the worker’s health. Given the expectations mentioned
above, we propose our altruism hypothesis: The greater
the possible benefits of early retirement for a worker (as
indicated by the worker’s stressful work, the worker’s
bad health, and the partner’s worry about the worker’s
health), the stronger his/her partner’s preference for the
worker’s early retirement.
Self-interest
Narrowly defined, self-interest indicates that people are
motivated by material interests (Miller, 1999). This defin-
ition is in line with so-called ‘thin’ rational choice models.
However, broader definitions of self-interestedness also
ascribe a role to non-exchangeable goods (Hechter and
Kanazawa, 1997). From this perspective, seeking positive
or avoiding negative emotions are influential motivators
(Tamarit and Sanchez, 2016). It is important to note that
while self-interest may lead to preferences or behaviour
that opposes other people’s preferences, this is not neces-
sarily the case. In the case of retirement, a partner may
prefer the worker’s early retirement due to self-interested
reasons, but the worker might develop the same prefer-
ence based on his/her own considerations.
Self-interested reasons to prefer the worker’s early re-
tirement might arise from a partner’s preference for his/
her own future work status. The partner’s future work
status determines how large an increase in shared time
he/she can expect upon the worker’s retirement and
thus, how eager the partner is for the worker to retire.
Even though new retirees, particularly women, increase
their hours of housework (Leopold and Skopek, 2018),
couples nonetheless also spend more time together upon
the retirement of either member of the couple (Genadek,
Flood and Moen, 2019). We expect that partners who
prefer to become or stay inactive in the labour force
themselves, as opposed to those who prefer to become
or stay active, have a stronger preference for the worker
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to retire. Moreover, the relationship sphere might give
rise to self-interested reasons to prefer the worker’s early
retirement. Possibilities for joint leisure increase when
the worker retires, irrespective of the partner’s work sta-
tus (Genadek, Flood and Moen, 2019). Relationship
quality influences how valuable shared time is for the
partner. Depending on this quality, a partner will be
more or less eager to see the possibilities for joint leisure
increase once the worker retires. We thus expect that the
higher the quality of the relationship is, the stronger are
partners’ preferences for the worker’s retirement.
Another factor that might give rise to self-interested rea-
sons for partners to prefer the worker’s early retirement
is the partner’s health. Long working hours of one mem-
ber of a couple can be detrimental to the health of the
other (Kleiner and Pavalko, 2014) and cohabiting or
marital partners are often the primary informal care-
givers for one another (Wolff and Kasper, 2006).
Partners in bad health might thus expect the worker’s re-
tirement to bring about an increase in the time the work-
er can spend on care tasks. Therefore, we expect that the
worse partners’ health is, the stronger are their preferen-
ces for the worker’s early retirement. Given the expecta-
tions mentioned above, we propose our self-interest
hypothesis: The greater the possible benefits of a work-
er’s early retirement for his/her partner (as indicated by
the partner’s preference not to work in the future, high
relationship quality, and the partner’s bad health), the
stronger the partner’s preference for the worker’s early
retirement.
Mechanisms of Partner Influence
A partner can either persuade or pressure workers into
early retirement. Both persuasion and pressure are funda-
mental processes of social influence (Turner, 1991;
Harkins and Williams, 2017). Workers are persuaded
when they change their preferences for early retirement
according to their partner’s preference and subsequently
act upon these changed preferences. Workers are pres-
sured when they act according to their partner’s prefer-
ence for the worker’s retirement, irrespective of the
worker’s own preference. We elaborate on persuasion and
pressure as mechanisms of how a partner’s preference
influences workers’ early retirement below.
Persuasion
Persuasion is a form of informational social influence.
Informational influence stems from ‘accept[ing] infor-
mation obtained from another as evidence about reality’
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955: p. 629). People generally
feel the need to know that the decisions they take are
correct. Information provided by others can help to
make these correct decisions. Previous research suggests
that a partner is particularly likely to be the source of in-
formational influence in the retirement decision, because
older workers discuss retirement primarily with their
partner, rather than with their co-workers or supervisor
(Henkens and Van Solinge, 2003). According to the clas-
sic treatment by Festinger (1953), persuasion leads to
public compliance with private acceptance. In the case
of retirement, this means that workers adapt their pref-
erences to those of their partner and subsequently be-
have according to these preferences. Therefore, we
propose our persuasion hypothesis: The stronger a part-
ner’s preference for the worker’s early retirement is, the
stronger is the worker’s preference for him-/herself. The
worker’s stronger preference ultimately makes his/her
early retirement more likely.
Pressure
Pressure is a form of normative social influence.
Normative influence stems from wanting to ‘conform
with the positive expectations of another’ (Deutsch and
Gerard, 1955: p. 629). This need to conform is particu-
larly strong when the influencing agent has the power to
offer rewards or threaten with punishments (compli-
ance; Kelman, 2006). Rewards and punishments might
be of material or social nature. For example, bestowing
approval or showing disapproval can pressure people
into acting according to the influencer’s wishes. The ap-
proval and disapproval of a cohabiting or marital part-
ner are often particularly meaningful. According to
Festinger (1953), pressure leads to public compliance
without private acceptance. In the case of retirement,
this means workers maintain their initial preferences,
but retire according to their partner’s preference to gain
their partner’s approval and to avoid arguments about
this issue that might threaten the relationship.
Therefore, we propose our pressure hypothesis: The
stronger a partner’s preference for the worker’s early re-
tirement is, the more likely is the worker to retire early,
irrespective of the worker’s own preference.
Figure 1 provides a summary of our theoretical
model and the four main hypotheses. As can be seen, we
expect that partners’ preferences originate in altruism
and self-interest. Persuasion and pressure are expected
to be the mechanisms through which a partner’s prefer-
ence affects workers’ early retirement behaviour.
Gendered Effects
We study male workers and their female partners as well
as female workers and their male partners, because the
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origins of a partner’s preference for the worker’s early
retirement and the mechanisms of partner influence may
differ by gender. When interpreting gender differences in
the results, we need to keep in mind that the female
workers studied here are a selective group. They are
employed shortly before reaching public pension age,
but belong to a cohort of women for whom it is relative-
ly uncommon to participate in the labour market. In the
Netherlands, about 36 per cent of the women born be-
tween 1950 and 1955 who have a partner participated
in the labour force at age 60 (Statistics Netherlands,
2019b).
According to social role theory, gender differences in
altruistic and self-interested behaviour arise from an
interplay of biology and socialization (Eagly and
Wendy, 2012). Women have been found to act more
pro-socially and have more concern for the welfare of
others than men (Grosch and Rau, 2017). Across cul-
tures and ages, women show higher levels of altruism-
related values and lower levels of competition-related
values than men (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Chapman
et al., 2007). Based on social role theory, we propose a
gendered origins hypothesis: A female partner’s prefer-
ence for the worker’s early retirement will originate
from altruism (as indicated by the worker’s stressful
work, the worker’s bad health, and the partner’s worry
about the worker’s health) more strongly and from self-
interest (as indicated by the partner’s preference not to
work in the future, high relationship quality, and the
partner’s bad health) less strongly than a male partner’s
preference.
Gender theory defines gender as ‘a lifelong process of
situated behavior that both reflects and reproduces a
structure of differentiation and control in which men
have material and ideological advantages’ (Ferree, 1990:
p. 870). Accordingly, men have been argued to be more
powerful (Ferree, 1990), more influential (Carli, 2001)
and less impressionable than women (Orji, Mandryk
and Vassileva, 2015). Within couples, we can generally
expect agreement to occur because women adopt the
views of their male partner rather than vice versa (Zipp,
Prohaska and Bemiller, 2004). However, this general ex-
pectation might not always hold. Irrespective of gender,
individuals whose sphere of interest is concerned in the
decision (Thomson, 1990) or who are perceived as
experts in a specific domain (Cialdini and Trost, 1998)
are particularly powerful influencers. Given that retire-
ment is at the intersection of the male work domain and
the female home domain, either gender may be more in-
fluential. Nonetheless, we propose a gendered influence
hypothesis based on gender theory: A female partner’s
preference will influence workers’ early retirement less




Between May and November 2015, data were collected
for the first wave of the NIDI Pension Panel Study
(NPPS). The NPPS is a survey of employees aged 60–65
who were enrolled in three large pension funds in the
Netherlands. A vast majority (91 per cent) of Dutch
employees are enrolled in occupational pension plans.
These plans are usually of the defined benefit type (94
per cent) and offer high pension replacement rates
(around 90 per cent; OECD, 2017). The funds that col-
laborated in the current study together represent about
49 per cent of the wage employed workers in the
Netherlands and their members hold diverse occupa-
tions in the sectors civil service and education, care and
social work, and construction. The sample was strati-
fied by organizational size and sector. In each of the
three pension funds, a sample of approximately 50
large, 200 medium-sized, and 300 small organizations
was drawn. Within the selected organizations, workers
of the birth cohorts from 1950 to 1955 were randomly
sampled. For more information on the sample and de-
sign of the NPPS, see Henkens et al. (2017).
For the current study, the NPPS is particularly valu-
able, because it provides the opportunity to study a large
number of couples, where data were collected from both
members of a couple. This kind of multi-actor data is
scarce compared with data available for individual-level
models. To distinguish between the two members of a
couple, we call those who were part of the initial sample
workers and those who participated because they were
linked to one of the workers through cohabitation or
marriage partners. Note, however, that partners might
also be active in the labour force. In addition to the sur-
vey data, workers’ pension funds provided administra-
tive data about early retirement behaviour within the 2
years immediately following data collection, thereby
enabling us to study the relation between early
Figure 1. Theoretical model of the nature of partner influence
on workers’ decision to retire early
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retirement preferences and behaviour in a longitudinal
manner.
Altogether 15,470 older workers and, where applic-
able, their partner received a mailed questionnaire.
Respondents could choose whether to return their ques-
tionnaire in a stamped envelope or to use a personal
code to fill in the questionnaire online. In total, 6,793
workers returned an eligible questionnaire (response
rate 44 per cent; 753 online; Henkens et al., 2017). We
excluded 106 respondents for whom we could not meas-
ure early retirement preferences before their actual be-
haviour, because they already received full pension
benefits—and thus retired—before the start of data col-
lection in May 2015 (n¼6,687). In the Dutch context,
the active labour force has traditionally been defined as
those workers who are gainfully employed for at least
12 working hours per week (Statistics Netherlands,
2019c). We adhered to this tradition and exclusively
included older workers who met this criterion
(n¼ 6,501). To be able to investigate early rather than
on-time or late retirement, we further restricted the sam-
ple to workers aged 60–63 (n¼ 5,161). In this way,
respondents who retired within 2 years after the first
wave did so before reaching public pension age, thus
retiring early. More than three-quarters of these older
workers indicated to have a cohabiting or married part-
ner (n¼ 4,069). Partners returned the questionnaire in
83 per cent of these cases (n¼ 3,389). Of the remaining
couples, we only included those in heterosexual relation-
ships in the analytic sample (n¼ 3,309).
Item non-response was low (<3 per cent) and never
exceeded 9 per cent for any single item. Under these cir-
cumstances, less rigorous missing data procedures than
multiple imputations are generally acceptable (Little
et al., 2014). We therefore dealt with missing data by re-
gression imputation with auxiliary variables (Enders,
2010: pp. 46–49).
Measures
Partners’ preferences for the worker’s early retirement
were measured based on the question ‘What would be
your preference with regard to the work situation of
your wife/husband/partner one year from now?’.
Partners answered this question on a five-point scale
(coded 1¼ strong preference that my partner is not
working, 2¼weak preference that my partner is not
working, 3¼no preference, 4¼weak preference that
my partner is working, 5¼ strong preference that my
partner is working). The variable was recoded so that
higher values indicate a stronger preference for
retirement.
Workers’ preferences for their own early retirement
were measured based on the question ‘What would be
your preferred work situation one year from now?’.
Workers answered this question on a five-point scale
(coded 1¼ strong preference for not working, 2¼weak
preference for not working, 3¼ no preference, 4¼weak
preference for working, 5¼ strong preference for work-
ing). The variable was recoded so that higher values in-
dicate a stronger preference for retirement.
Based on the administrative data provided by the
three collaborating pension funds, we were able to iden-
tify workers who officially retired within 2 years after
the first wave (before 1 May 2017). These workers were
classified as retired (1) while all other participants were
classified as (still) working (0). Receiving pension bene-
fits generally indicates the end of workers’ careers and
thus is an accepted definition of retirement (e.g.
Dingemans and Henkens, 2014). The cut-off date was
chosen as 1 May in order to observe retirement behav-
iour within 2 years after the start of the fieldwork for
the first wave. Given the age of the sample (60–63) and
the statutory retirement age for this cohort in the
Netherlands, retirement within 2 years of Wave 1 indi-
cates early retirement.
The coding details, psychometric properties and
wording of survey questions and items of all independ-
ent variables are presented in the Supplementary
Material available online (Table S1). Table 1 presents
the means and standard deviations of all variables by
the worker’s gender. Specifically, the stressfulness of
the worker’s job, the worker’s health, and the partner’s
concern about the worker’s health function as indica-
tors of altruism, while relationship quality, the part-
ner’s preferences for his/her own work status and the
partner’s health function as indicators of self-interest.
We control for the worker’s age, because early retire-
ment is more common the closer workers are to statu-
tory pension age. Within couples, men are generally
older than women, so we control for the age difference
between the members of a couple so that gender differ-
ences are not confounded by this fact. We further con-
trol for the worker’s gender and occupational status,
household wealth and the partner’s work status,
because all of these have been argued to affect early
retirement (Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage, 2003; Raymo
et al., 2011; Fisher, Chaffee and Sonnega, 2016; Topa,
Depolo and Alcover, 2018).
Design
To test our hypotheses, we estimated three equations:
one for partners’ preferences for the worker (EQ I), one
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for workers’ preferences for themselves (EQ II), and one
for workers’ early retirement behaviour (EQ III).
Partners’ (Yp) and workers’ (Yw) preferences were
expected to be interdependent, so single-equation esti-
mates for EQ I and EQ II would have yielded biased esti-
mates. Therefore, these equations were estimated using
a two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable
approach (Theil, 1971). In this procedure, partners’ and
workers’ preferences are two simultaneously determined
dependent (endogenous) variables. In the first stage,
each dependent variable is regressed on all independent
variables in the system (common predictors: Xc, unique
predictors for partners’ preferences: Xup, and unique pre-
dictors for workers’ preferences: Xuw). The resulting
reduced form coefficients are used as independent varia-
bles in the second stage to obtain the 2SLS estimates for
each equation in the system. Identification in a two-
equation system requires that each equation includes at
least one unique predictor. These so-called instruments
are assumed to directly affect the preferences of one
member of the couple, but to only have an indirect effect
on the other member’s preferences via the first member’s
preferences. In this study, partners’ preferences were
instrumented using their concern about the worker’s
health and preferred own future work status. Given that
we controlled for the worker’s self-reported health, we
expected partners’ concern about the worker’s health to
affect the worker’s preference only indirectly via the
partner’s preference. Given that we controlled for part-
ners’ current work status, we expected partners’ prefer-
ences for their own future work status to affect the
worker’s preference only indirectly via the partner’s
preference. Further testing showed that these instru-
ments jointly predicted partners’ preferences [F(2, 941)
¼ 255.95, P < 0.001]. Hansen’s (1982) over-identifica-
tion J-test statistic suggested that the instruments were
indeed exogenous [J(1) ¼ 0.19, P ¼ 0.665]. Workers’
preferences were instrumented using their job satisfac-
tion and retirement anxiety. Given that we controlled
for workers’ occupational status and stress, we expected
workers’ individual evaluations to affect the partner’s
preference only indirectly via the worker’s preference.
Further testing suggested that these instruments jointly
predicted workers’ preferences [F(2, 940) ¼ 188.25, P <
0.001]. Hansen’s (1982) over-identification J-test statis-
tic suggested that the instruments were indeed
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for male (n¼ 2,036) and female (n¼ 1,273) workers
Dependent and independent variables Male worker Female worker
M SD M SD
Dependent variables
Partner’s preference for worker 2.84 1.62 2.94 1.51
Worker’s preference for selfa 2.92 1.63 2.63 1.61
Worker’s early retirement behaviour 0.15 0.35 0.14 0.34
Altruism
Worker’s stressful work 2.71 0.89 2.70 0.89
Worker’s health 3.16 0.86 3.29 0.87
Partner’s concern about worker’s healtha 2.09 0.82 1.94 0.77
Self-interest
Partner’s preference own work status 2.59 1.60 3.11 1.66
Relationship quality 4.46 0.60 4.47 0.56
Partner’s health 3.30 0.90 3.34 0.92
Shared controls
Worker’s age 61.40 1.09 61.31 1.10
Age difference 2.39 3.38 2.17 3.87
Female worker (Ref. ¼Male) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Worker’s occupational status
Wealth (in 100,000 e) 1.87 1.84 2.02 1.99
Partner works (Ref. ¼ Partner does not work) 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49
Worker’s unique predictors
Worker’s job satisfaction 5.26 1.05 5.38 1.00
Worker’s retirement anxiety 2.21 0.79 2.58 0.90
aPartner’s unique predictors.
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exogenous [J(1) ¼ 2.19, P ¼ 0.139]. Thus, we simultan-
eously estimated:




Xci þ pi EQ I




Xci þ wi; EQ II
where Y^ p and Y^ w are the predicted values of partners’
and workers’ preferences, Xu denotes sets of instruments
for partners’ and workers’ preferences while Xc denotes
a set of common predictors. Individual couples are indi-
cated by i.
Workers’ early retirement behaviour was estimated
in a logistic regression as follows:
Ybi ¼ abYpi þ bbYwi þ cb
X
Xci þ bi; EQ III
where Yp and Yw are partners’ and workers’ observed
preferences, Xc denotes the same set of common predic-
tors used to estimate partners’ and workers’ preferences,
and individual couples are indicated by i. In all analyses,
standard errors were clustered within organizations to
allow for common effects of the organizational context
on early retirement preferences and behaviour.
Our hypotheses concerning the origins of partners’
preferences were tested based on EQ I, where the effect
of altruism and self-interest are represented by different
sets of unique and common predictors. Specifically, to
assess the role of altruism, we investigated the effects of
the worker’s level of stress at work, the worker’s health,
and the partner’s concern about the worker’s health. To
assess the role of self-interest, we investigated the effects
of the partner’s preference for own future work status,
relationship quality, and the partner’s own health.
Concerning the mechanisms of spousal influence,
we measured persuasion as the product of aw (EQ II)
and bb (EQ III), i.e. the effect of a partner’s preference
on the worker’s preference and the effect of the work-
er’s preference on the worker’s behaviour. We tested
the mediation effect by applying the KHB method.
Conceptually, this means that a partner’s preference
affects workers’ preferences and that workers act upon
these changed preferences. Pressure is represented by
the coefficient ab, which is the effect of a partner’s pref-
erence on workers’ behaviour. This effect means that
workers’ behaviour is influenced by their partner’s
preference after having taken the worker’s preference
into account.
To gain insight into gender differences in the origins
and mechanisms of partner influence, we estimated all
equations separately for male and female workers. We
subsequently tested whether the coefficients in the two
samples significantly differed from one another.
Results
Descriptive Findings
In order to better understand the results with regards to
the origins and mechanisms of partner influence, we first
present descriptive statistics of the dependent variables.
As can be seen in Table 2, most partners had strong pref-
erences for the worker to either continue working (30
per cent) or retire early (24 per cent). Similarly to part-
ners, the majority of workers either strongly preferred to
continue working (35 per cent) or to retire early (25 per
cent). Fewer workers had more moderate preferences.
Only a small share of older workers retired early in
the 2 years of this study (14 per cent; n¼ 469; by gender
see worker’s early retirement behaviour in Table 1). To
gain better insights of the share of workers who will
have retired early when reaching age 65, we present life
table estimates in Figure 2. We assume that all workers
in our sample were employed at age 60. The estimates
were based on monthly information on age and retire-
ment timing. By age 61, less than 1 per cent had exited
the labour force. In total, 4 per cent had retired before
turning 62 and 13 per cent before turning 63. When
approaching the statutory retirement age, early labour
market exit became more common. Almost 30 per cent of
those employed at age 60 had retired before age 64 and
about half had retired before turning 65. Thus, a note-
worthy group of older workers retired early, but generally
only a year or two before reaching public pension age.
Origins of Partners’ Preferences
Table 3 shows the result of the 2SLS analysis of part-
ners’ preferences for the worker’s early retirement.
Partners’ preferences were partially endogenous.
Partners’ preferences for the worker’s retirement were
significantly affected by the preference the worker had
for himself/herself. In line with our altruism and self-
interest hypotheses, we also found evidence for exogen-
ous preferences.
Concerning our altruism hypothesis, the stressfulness
of the worker’s work and partners’ concern about the
worker’s health significantly affected partners’ preferen-
ces. As expected, the more stressful the worker’s work
was and the more worried partners’ were about the
worker’s health, the stronger were partners’ preferences
for the worker’s early retirement, even when controlling
for the worker’s own preferences. We did not find sig-
nificant effects of the worker’s actual health on partners’
preferences.
The self-interest hypothesis also received support: we
found a significant effect of partners’ preference for their
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own future work status on partners’ preferences. As
expected, the higher partners’ own preference to retire,
the stronger were their preferences for the worker’s early
retirement, even when controlling for the worker’s own
preference. We did not find significant effects of rela-
tionship quality and partners’ own health on their
preferences.
With regards to the control variables, male partners
were significantly more in favour of the worker’s early
retirement. The higher the occupational status of the
worker, the weaker his/her partner’s preference for the
worker’s early retirement. The worker’s age, the age
difference within the couple, household wealth, and the
partner’s work status did not significantly affect part-
ners’ preferences.
Mechanisms of Partner Influence
Persuasion
The first column of Table 4 shows the results of the
2SLS analysis of workers’ preferences for their own early
retirement. In line with our persuasion hypothesis, the
stronger a partner preferred the worker’s early retire-
ment, the stronger were also the worker’s preferences.
To examine the full process of persuasion, we need to
look at column two of Table 4, which shows the results
of the logistic regression of workers’ early retirement be-
haviour. Here, we see that workers’ preferences for
themselves significantly affected their subsequent retire-
ment behaviour. More importantly, based on the KHB
method, the indirect effect of a partner’s preference on
the worker’s behaviour via the worker’s preference was
statistically significant (b ¼ 0.29, P < 0.001) and
explained 50 per cent of the total effect. Overall, these
results strongly support our persuasion hypothesis.
Thus, partners persuaded the worker to adapt his/her
preference for early retirement to the partner’s prefer-
ence and to subsequently act upon these changed
preferences.
For the effects of all control variables on workers’
preferences for their own early retirement, see the first
column of Table 4. A higher age of the worker, a work-
ing partner, and stressfulness of the worker’s work were
associated with stronger preferences for early retirement
among workers. Female workers, workers with higher
occupational status, and workers in better health had
weaker preferences for early retirement. The age
difference within the couple, household wealth, the part-
ner’s health, and relationship quality did not significant-
ly affect workers’ preferences.
Pressure
To test our pressure hypothesis, we again have to con-
sult the second column of Table 4. In line with this hy-
pothesis, the stronger partners’ preferences for the
worker’s early retirement were the more likely the work-
er was to retire early. This effect is controlled for the ef-
fect of the worker’s own preferences. Thus, even
workers who did not prefer early retirement were more
likely to retire early nonetheless, if their partner pre-
ferred them to do so. Due to the interdependence be-
tween both partners’ preferences, we would have
overestimated the effect of a partner’s preference on
workers’ behaviour if we had not included workers’
preferences in the model (b ¼ 0.53, P < 0.001; results
not shown).
The second column of Table 4 also shows the effects
of the control variables on workers’ early retirement be-
haviour. Higher age of the worker, higher household
wealth, and better health of the worker and partner
made early retirement more likely. Higher occupational
status of the worker made early retirement less likely.
The age difference within the couple, the worker’s gen-
der, the partner’s work status, relationship quality and
the stressfulness of the worker’s job were not associated
with early retirement behaviour. Note, that all effects
are adjusted for the worker’s preference and thus cannot
be compared with those found in other studies.
Gendered Effects
To test in what ways origins and mechanisms of partner
influence differ by gender of the worker, we estimated
separate models for men and women. Note that when we
analyse women as workers below, the focus is on older
women who work for pay at least 12 hours a week. Given
Figure 2. Percentage still working by age for workers who were
employed at age 60: life table estimates
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that female labour market participation was relatively un-
common in this cohort (Statistics Netherlands, 2019b),
the group of female older workers is more select than the
women who are in the partner sample.
Origins by gender
In our gendered origins hypothesis, we expected female
parnters’ preferences to originate from altruism more
strongly and from self-interest less strongly than male
partners’ preferences. When turning to altruism, the
results presented in Table 5 suggest that indicators of al-
truism significantly affected the preferences of female
but not male partners. Specifically, higher levels of stress
at the worker’s work and the partner’s concern about
the worker’s health were significantly associated with
partners’ stronger preferences for the worker’s early re-
tirement among female, but not among male partners.
The coefficients for stressful work (z ¼ 0.79, P ¼ 0.431)
and the worker’s health (z¼ 1.30, P ¼ 0.193) did not
significantly differ between male and female partners,
but the effect of health concerns was significantly
stronger for female than for male partners (z¼2.24,
P ¼ 0.025).
The results on self-interest in Table 5 suggest that the
preferences of male and female partners originated from
self-interest to a comparable degree. Male and female
partners both preferred the worker to retire early more
strongly if they preferred to be out of the labour force
themselves in the near future. When comparing the coef-
ficients between samples, we found no significant differ-
ences in the effect of the partner’s preference for his/her
own future work status (z ¼ 0.54, P ¼ 0.592), relation-
ship quality (z ¼ 0.12, P ¼ 0.904), and the partner’s
health (z ¼ 0.79, P ¼ 0.428) by gender.
Influence by gender
Male and female workers were both persuaded into
early retirement by their partner to a comparable degree.
In both samples, workers’ early retirement preferences
were strongly affected by their partner’s preference and
workers’ preferences, in turn, strongly affected workers’
behaviour (see Table 6). Moreover, the indirect effect of
a partner’s preference on workers’ behaviour via the
worker’s own preference was significant for men (b ¼
0.26, P < 0.001) as well as women (b ¼ 0.31, P <
0.001) and did not differ significantly between the two
Table 2. Distribution of partners’ and workers’ preferences (in per cent)
Answer possibilities Partner’s preference for worker Worker’s preference for self
Total Male worker Female worker Total Male worker Female worker
Strong pref. working 30 33 26 35 32 39
Weak pref. working 16 15 17 15 14 17
No pref. 14 13 17 9 10 8
Weak pref. not working 15 14 18 17 17 15
Strong pref. not working 24 26 22 24 27 21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Observations 3,309 2,036 1,273 3,309 2,036 1,273
Table 3. Origins of partners’ preferences for the worker’s
early retirement (n¼ 3,309)
Independent variables Partner’s preference for worker
Coef. P-value
Altruism
Worker’s stressful work 0.07** (0.009)








Relationship quality 0.07 (0.101)





Worker age 0.05 (0.061)
Age difference 0.01 (0.410)
Female worker (Ref. ¼
Male worker)
0.19** (0.000)
Occupational status 0.07** (0.004)
Wealth (in 100,000 e) 0.01 (0.334)
Partner works (Ref. ¼
Partner does not work)
0.01 (0.892)
Constant 3.39* (0.028)
Notes: Clustered standard errors within organization. Two-stage least
squares regression results.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
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samples, z ¼ 0.39, P ¼ 0.695. Partner pressure
affected male and female workers’ early retirement to a
comparable degree when controlling for workers’ pref-
erences (see Table 6). There also was no significant dif-
ference in the strength of the coefficients by gender, z ¼
0.58, P ¼ 0.428. Overall, these results suggest that
male and female partners influence the worker’s early
retirement equally strongly and that there is no differ-
ence in the mechanisms through which they exert this in-
fluence. So, there appears to be no power difference by
gender.
Discussion
In the literature on labour force participation it is widely
acknowledged that a partner plays a role in decisions
about work and career (Loretto and Vickerstaff, 2013;
Stertz, Grether and Wiese, 2017). Traditionally, the ef-
fect of a partner is studied rather indirectly by taking
partner characteristics into account in otherwise
individual-level models (e.g. Dahl, Nilsen and Vaage,
2003). However, researchers recognize that a partner’s
perception is important to the couple’s decision process
and a few studies actually collect data from both
members of the couple (e.g. Abraham, Auspurg and
Hinz, 2010). We extend the literature even further by
investigating the nature of social influence in couples.
Specifically, we focus on the origins and mechanisms of
partner influence in the case of workers’ early retirement
decision. Early retirement is a highly relevant, but rela-
tively understudied example of partner influences.
Substantively, our study not only contributes to the
understanding of retirement decisions in a couple con-
text, but also sheds light on how couples arrive at joint
decisions more generally. Regarding the origins of part-
ner influences, this study provides evidence that a part-
ner’s preference is partly endogenous, as partners adapt
their own preferences to those workers have for them-
selves. Nonetheless, partners also have independent rea-
sons to prefer a worker’s exit from the labour force.
These preferences derive from altruistic motives and the
wish to promote the worker’s well-being, as well as
from self-interested motives which are in line with the
idea that couples often prefer to be jointly inactive in the
labour market (Syse et al., 2014; Eismann, Henkens and
Kalmijn, 2017). Overall, partners’ exogenous preferen-
ces for a worker’s labour force participation seem to be
based slightly more in self-interest than in altruism.
Table 4.Mechanisms of partner influence on the worker’s early retirement (n¼ 3,309)
Independent variables Worker’s preference for self Worker’s early retirement behaviour
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Persuasion
Partner’s preference for worker 0.46** (0.000)
Worker’s preference for self 0.60** (0.000)
Pressure
Partner’s preference for worker 0.28** (0.000)
Controls
Worker age 0.22** (0.000) 0.42** (0.000)
Age difference 0.00 (0.485) 0.03 (0.090)
Female worker (Ref. ¼Male) 0.13* (0.019) 0.02 (0.891)
Occupational status 0.10** (0.000) 0.20** (0.001)
Wealth (in 100,000 e) 0.02 (0.087) 0.09** (0.001)
Partner works (Ref. ¼ Partner does not work) 0.12* (0.023) 0.04 (0.709)
Worker’s health 0.13** (0.000) 0.14* (0.041)
Partner’s health 0.05 (0.080) 0.16** (0.006)
Relationship quality 0.07 (0.099) 0.00 (0.980)
Worker’s stressful work 0.09** (0.003) 0.06 (0.381)
Worker’s unique predictors
Worker’s job satisfaction 0.27** (0.000)
Worker’s retirement anxiety 0.23** (0.000)
Constant 10.26** (0.000) 32.28** (0.000)
Notes: Clustered standard errors within organization. Effects on workers’ preferences (2SLS) and behaviour (logit).
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
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Perhaps altruism has a weaker impact on partners’ pref-
erences when the interdependencies between the part-
ner’s and the worker’s preferences are taken into
account: A worker’s preference and his/her partner’s al-
truism are likely to share their roots, whereas a partner’s
self-interested preference derives from other factors.
Regarding the mechanisms of spousal influence, we
find evidence of persuasion within couples. A partner’s
preference for the worker indirectly affects the worker’s
behaviour via his/her own preference. However, the cur-
rent study suggests that partners also directly influence
the worker’s early retirement behaviour even when their
persuasive attempts fail. In other words, a partner can
pressure workers to retire early even if workers do not
prefer this for themselves. Overall, partner influences on
workers’ early retirement run via both persuasion and
pressure.
Social influence in couples is ubiquitous. Decisions in
various life spheres, such as work, fertility, housing, and
leisure activities, are likely to be influenced by one’s
partner. Nonetheless, the retirement decision is often
studied as an individual process. Our study shows that
workers’ preferences have a stronger impact on their
partner’s preference than vice versa. This is in line with
previous findings (Henkens, 1999) and suggests that
when a decision concerns the behaviour of one member
of the couple (the worker), this member generally also
has more say in it. However, we also find evidence that
partners do not simply adapt their preferences to those
the worker has for him-/herself, but also base them on
altruism and self-interest. Moreover, partners have a
strong influence on the worker’s behaviour via both per-
suasion and pressure.
We find some support for gender differences in the
origins though not in the mechanisms of partner influ-
ence on workers’ labour force participation. Regarding
the origins of partners’ preferences, we provide limited
support that altruism plays a more important role in
forming female as compared with male partners’ prefer-
ences. This is in line with research on partner influences
on health behaviour (Waite and Gallagher, 2001). We
do not find gender differences with regards to origins in
self-interest. The question of whether gender differences
in the origins of partners’ preferences are due to biology
or gendered socialization might be addressed in future
research. Based on gender theory, we expected female
workers to be affected by their male partner more
strongly than vice versa. Our findings do not support
this expectation. Retirement is at the intersection of
the male work domain and the female home domain.
Table 5. Origins of partners’ preferences for the worker’s early retirement for male (n¼ 2,036) and female (n¼ 1,273)
workers
Independent variables Partner’s preference for worker
Male worker Female worker
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Altruism
Worker’s stressful work 0.09* (0.020) 0.04 (0.285)
Worker’s health 0.06 (0.124) 0.02 (0.690)
Partner’s concerns about worker’s health 0.17** (0.000) 0.03 (0.577)
Self-interest
Partner’s preference own work status 0.27** (0.000) 0.30** (0.000)
Relationship quality 0.07 (0.211) 0.06 (0.290)
Partner’s health 0.00 (0.977) 0.04 (0.298)
Controls
Worker’s preference for self 0.59** (0.000) 0.58** (0.000)
Worker age 0.08* (0.029) 0.00 (0.965)
Age difference 0.01 (0.468) 0.00 (0.771)
Occupational status 0.05 (0.154) 0.14** (0.001)
Wealth (in 100,000 e) 0.01 (0.483) 0.01 (0.638)
Partner works (Ref. ¼ Partner does not work) 0.04 (0.606) 0.07 (0.391)
Constant 5.54* (0.011) 0.31 (0.885)
Notes: Clustered standard errors within organization. Two-stage least squares regression results.
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
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In contrast to traditional gender theory, it is plausible
that women have considerable power in the domestic
sphere (Wiesmann et al., 2008) and that they are less
susceptible to social influence when the issue falls within
their own area of expertise (Zipp et al., 2004). When
interpreting the results with regards to gender, we need
to keep in mind that our sample of female workers is se-
lective. We only studied women who were employed for
at least 12 hours a week at age 60. Many women who
are more susceptible to their partner’s influence might
have already left the labour market by that age.
Our methodological approach relies on multi-actor
and longitudinal data. The availability of multi-actor
data allows us to investigate the origins of partners’
preferences. It is crucial to collect data from both mem-
bers of the couple to estimate the extent to which work-
ers and their partner influence each other’s preferences
for the worker’s labour force participation. The longitu-
dinal aspect of the data allows us to connect the part-
ner’s and the worker’s preference with the worker’s
subsequent behaviour. This adds to a field that generally
investigates either preferences or behaviour and that
exclusively focuses on workers’ preferences. Thus, the
design of our study is uniquely suited to investigate the
origins and mechanisms of social influence in couples.
This is a noteworthy extension of designs that have pre-
viously been used to investigate spousal influence.
Generally, research in such diverse fields as work, fertil-
ity, housing, and leisure activities has either investigated
the origins (e.g. Matias and Fontaine, 2017) or the
mechanisms of partner influence (e.g. Bronner and De
Hoog, 2008).
Some limitations of this study should be kept in mind
when drawing conclusions from our results.
Unfortunately, we only have longitudinal data on behav-
iour, not on preferences. We aim to overcome this limi-
tation by using an instrumental variable approach.
Although the availability of plausible instruments allows
us to estimate social influence in couples despite the lack
of longitudinal data on preferences, the dynamics of the
mutual influence in couples cannot be uncovered using
this method. Limits remain with regards to the conclu-
sions we can draw about changes in preferences over
time. This also impairs our differentiation between
Table 6. Mechanisms of partner influence on the worker’s early retirement for male (n¼ 2,036) and female (n¼ 1,273)
workers
Independent variables Workers’ preference for self Workers’ early retirement behaviour
Male worker Female worker Male worker Female worker
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Persuasion
Partner’s preference for worker 0.41** (0.000) 0.52** (0.000)
Worker’s preference for self 0.56** (0.000) 0.63** (0.000)
Pressure
Partner’s preference for worker 0.28** (0.000) 0.33** (0.000)
Controls
Worker age 0.23** (0.000) 0.21** (0.000) 0.41** (0.000) 0.47** (0.000)
Age difference 0.00 (0.782) 0.01 (0.309) 0.04 (0.067) 0.01 (0.674)
Occupational status 0.17** (0.000) 0.05 (0.251) 0.31** (0.000) 0.06 (0.614)
Wealth (in 100,000 e) 0.03 (0.083) 0.01 (0.516) 0.14** (0.000) 0.04 (0.405)
Partner works (Ref. ¼ Partner does not work) 0.16* (0.019) 0.03 (0.763) 0.05 (0.731) 0.05 (0.816)
Worker’s health 0.12** (0.002) 0.13** (0.005) 0.08 (0.380) 0.25* (0.022)
Partner’s health 0.00 (0.887) 0.10* (0.022) 0.17* (0.029) 0.13 (0.143)
Relationship quality 0.08 (0.135) 0.06 (0.407) 0.02 (0.887) 0.02 (0.903)
Worker’s stressful work 0.10* (0.016) 0.09 (0.058) 0.08 (0.350) 0.30* (0.010)
Worker’s unique predictors
Worker’s job satisfaction 0.27** (0.000) 0.24** (0.000)
Worker’s retirement anxiety 0.25** (0.000) 0.22** (0.000)
Constant 10.99** (0.000) 10.14** (0.000) 30.42** (0.000) 36.58** (0.000)
Notes: Clustered standard errors within organization. Effects on workers’ preferences (2SLS) and behaviour (logit).
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01.
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persuasion and pressure. Within the 2 years that max-
imally lay between the first wave of data collection and
workers’ early retirement, partners might have suc-
ceeded in persuading the worker to share his/her part-
ner’s preferences. Thus, we might overestimate pressure
at the expense of persuasion. This means that we need
to be cautious about the proportion of spousal influence
we attribute to persuasion and pressure, but we are con-
fident that both mechanisms play a role. Moreover, our
results clearly suggest that the pre-retirement process in
couples is characterized by a process of strong mutual
influence.
Another limitation is that we infer persuasion and
pressure from the effects of partner preferences on work-
ers’ preferences and behaviour. Although this is an im-
portant step to show the mechanisms through which
partner preferences impact older workers, an interesting
follow-up question is whether partners and workers ac-
tually experience what we label persuasion and pressure
as such. Naturally, partners’ and workers’ perceptions
of spousal influence are subject to biases, but in combin-
ation with the statistical evidence for the existence of
persuasion and pressure as influencing mechanisms that
the current study presents, perceptions can provide in-
formation of how couples experience this influence.
Moreover, future studies might investigate in which way
exactly partners persuade or pressure workers. These
might be either subtle or blatant influential attempts.
Earlier studies in the health domain have shown that
spousal pressure to live a healthier life often produces a
less healthy lifestyle (Martire et al., 2013). Thus, some
partners who actively aim to influence workers, might
be quite ineffective, while others make limited, but com-
pelling attempts at influencing workers. The current
study shows to which degree spousal persuasion and
pressure are successful at influencing older workers, but
this does not allow for strong conclusions about the ex-
tent to which partners try to influence workers.
However, previous research has shown that older work-
ers often discuss retirement with their partner (Henkens
and Van Solinge, 2003). This suggests that if they are
motivated, partners can and will influence older work-
ers’ retirement process.
Next to theoretical implications, some practical
implications for the retirement process of couples follow
from our findings. We can conclude that even though re-
tirement strictly concerns the behaviour of an individual,
it is clearly not a purely individual decision. Rather, it is
a joint decision-making process of older couples. Each
member of the couple enters this process with his or her
own ideas. When either member approaches public
pension age, this initiates discussion and mutual influ-
ence within the couple. The process of mutual influence
can have quite personal implications for older couples.
The negotiation about each partner’s retirement timing
is likely to be challenging. Both members of the couple
might have conflicting interests and the retirement of ei-
ther partner can bring about changes in well-established
roles and the distribution of power. The way couples
deal with these challenges might affect how satisfied
they are in the transition to old age. If couples cannot
find common ground when discussing retirement this
might strain the relationship and might increase the risk
of divorce, which has become more common among
older adults in the Netherlands, in the past decades
(Statistics Netherlands, 2018b). It is clear that that the
decision to retire is not simply a decision whether or not
to stop working, but that it will have broader effects on
a couple’s shared life.
In the future, the retirement decision-making pro-
cess in couples is likely to become increasingly complex
due to two developments. First, the variety of relation-
ships at older age increases. There are trends towards
more dual-career couples (Statistics Netherlands,
2019b) and more higher order unions (Pasteels and
Mortelmans, 2017), which are often characterized by
larger age differences between partners and ‘non-stand-
ard’ forms (e.g. unmarried cohabitation or living apart
together; De Jong Gierveld, 2004). All in all, there is
increasing complexity of coupled life (Cherlin, 2010).
This complexity will raise additional questions with
regards to couples’ retirement decision. For example,
dual-career couples have to discuss both partners’ re-
tirement, each of which is dependent of the preferences
and behaviour of the other (Eismann, Henkens and
Kalmijn, 2017). Second, the complexity of retirement
pathways grows. Around the world, governments are
raising public pension ages in order to keep their pen-
sion systems sustainable (OECD, 2017). This increases
the economic insecurity in old age. Moreover, for a
growing number of workers the transition from full-
time work to full retirement is blurred (Maestas, 2010;
Shultz and Wang, 2011; Dingemans and Henkens,
forthcoming). The increasing complexity of both
coupled life and the retirement process prompts ques-
tions about how members of a couple influence each
other in the transition towards post-retirement life.
Distinguishing between altruism and self-interest as
origins and persuasion and pressure as mechanisms of a
partner’s influence, as in this study, are increasingly
relevant to understand how older couples transition
into old age in the future.
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